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Historical Tour
Some trade disputes—like long Rus-
sian novels—never seem to end. The
United States, Europe, and other trading
nations have disputed the taxation of ex-
port earnings since the 1970s. To under-
stand why the Foreign Sales Corporation
(FSC) dispute is so hard to resolve, we
must start with a historical tour.1
The 1960 Working Party Report
In 1960, a GATT (General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade) Working Party codi-
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fied the ancient distinction (dating from the
19th century) between permissible and im-
permissible adjustments at the border for
national taxes. The “origin principle” was
prescribed for direct taxes, meaning that
there could be no adjustments at the bor-
der—direct taxes could neither be imposed
on imports nor rebated on exports. By con-
trast, the “destination principle” was pre-
scribed for indirect taxes, permitting adjust-
ments at the border—indirect taxes could
both be imposed on imports and rebated
(or not collected) on exports. But there is
no GATT requirement for symmetry. A
country can choose to rebate its indirect
taxes on exports, yet not impose them on
imports, or vice versa.
The distinction between “direct” and “in-
direct” taxes made sense in the 19th cen-
tury when only two types of taxation were
widely used—excise taxes (indirect taxes)
and property taxes (direct taxes). In that
bygone world, it was reasonable to suppose
that indirect taxes would be passed on in
higher product prices and direct taxes
would be borne by property owners. The
major indirect taxes of the era were excise
taxes on sumptuary goods like tobacco and
spirits. If taxes on whisky, for example,
could not be adjusted at the border, the
taxing country would be flooded with im-
ports of whisky, but local distillers could
hardly sell their heavily taxed brew in for-
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 of export earnings
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1. Readers interested in detailed legal analysis of the
WTO decisions should consult Funk (2001). I dis-
agree with some of Funk’s legal analysis. More im-
portantly, his treatment concentrates on scriptual
detail and misses important economic drives behind
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eign markets. In that context, destination-
principle border adjustments made a lot of sense. Conversely,
it made no sense to attribute property taxes to indi-
vidual products and then adjust them at the border.
By 1960, public revenues were derived from many
sources besides excise and property taxes. The
question addressed by the Working Party was which
of the “new” taxes could be adjusted at the border
and which could not. The main taxes under
consideration were social security taxes, corporate
income taxes, and various kinds of sales taxes.
Border adjustments were permitted for sales taxes,
but ruled out for social security and corporate income
taxes. Value added taxes (VAT) were then little used.
Owing to the fact that several European countries
replaced their cumbersome multi-stage sales taxes
(cascade taxes) with VAT systems during the 1960s,
it seemed a reasonable extension of the 1960 Working
Party analysis to classify value added taxes as
indirect taxes.
However—and this is an important historical
point—under the US countervailing duty law of that
era, the United States had the option of imposing
countervailing duties (CVDs) against value added
taxes that were rebated (or not collected) on exports.
To maintain harmony in the trading system, the US
Treasury (then the administering authority) decided
in the early 1970s not to impose CVDs against VAT
rebates. The critical US policy decision to classify
VAT as an indirect tax eligible for border adjustment
was not embodied in GATT jurisprudence until the
Tokyo Round Code on Subsidies was ratified in 1979.
The classification scheme adopted by the 1960
Working Party, and subsequently extended to the
VAT, was loosely justified by an appeal to “tax inci-
dence.” Indirect taxes are supposedly passed forward
in higher product prices, direct taxes are suppos-
edly passed back in lower factor earnings. But mere
labels say nothing about the actual incidence of taxes
in a modern economy. In a modern open economy,
the actual incidence of taxes (whether forward in
product prices or backward in factor earnings) de-
pends on the uniformity of the tax, competitive con-
ditions in the marketplace, and importantly whether
or not the tax is adjusted at the border. In other
words, tax incidence is as much a result of border
adjustment rules as a reason for adopting any par-
ticular set of rules.
An example may help clarify thinking about tax
incidence in an open economy. If country A imposes
a 10 percent VAT on all manufactured products and
does not adjust the VAT at the border, competition
from imported manufactured goods will prevent lo-
cal firms from passing their VAT forward to domes-
tic consumers in the form of higher product prices.
Nor will local firms be able to charge higher prices
abroad to cover the VAT on exports. After all, com-
petitive conditions did not change in foreign mar-
kets simply because country A decided to impose a
nonadjustable VAT. Unable to pass the VAT forward
in product prices, local firms will simply have to
accept lower factor earnings—wages, profits, and
rents will have to fall.
By contrast, if country A decides to adjust its
VAT at the border, imported manufactures will pay
the 10 percent tax, and local firms will be able to
charge higher prices in the domestic market. More-
over, local firms will be able to export their manu-
factures free of VAT, so their net proceeds from sales
abroad will not be affected. With an adjustable VAT,
local firms can pass the tax forward in product prices,
and avoid any reduction in factor earnings. Much
the same analysis can be applied to the corporate
income tax. Border adjustment rules largely deter-
mine whether the corporate income tax is passed
forward in product prices or backward in factor earn-
ings.
To be sure, in a general equilibrium framework,
exchange rate changes and international capital
movements come into play, ultimately shaping the
incidence of various business taxes. From the stand-
point of competing firms, however, exchange rate
adjustments seem like the unsure promise of an
academic economist. Businessmen are far more con-
cerned about the here-and-now of border adjustment
rules than the future possibility of compensating
exchange rate changes. Tax adjustments at the bor-
der are almost always seen as an advantage to local
firms, whatever the ultimate general equilibrium
exchange rate outcome may be.
Seen in this light, whatever basis the simple di-
rect/indirect dichotomy may have had in the by-
gone world of property and excise taxes, it lost its
rationale when a line was drawn between permitted
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border adjustments for the VAT and the corporate
income tax.
As a consequence of the twists of tax history,
however, destination-principle adjustments are pro-
hibited for the corporate income tax on export earn-
ings but permitted for the VAT. The distinction per-
sists to this day, despite the obvious point that a
VAT amounts to a combination of several direct taxes:
a direct tax on profits earned by the corporation, a
direct tax on interest and rent paid by the corpora-
tion, and a direct tax on wages.2 In other words GATT
alchemy transforms a series of direct taxes into a
single indirect tax, eligible for adjustment at the
border. Lacking this magical transformation, a single
direct tax on corporate profits cannot be adjusted at
the border.
From the standpoint of US exporters, their Eu-
ropean competitors enjoyed a significant tax advan-
tage. European exports arriving in US ports were
free of VAT; US exports arriving in European ports
paid both US corporate tax and the European VAT .
Subpart F
The tax tilt resulting from the 1960 Working Party
Report was worsened by US legislation a few years
later. To be sure, this was a self-inflicted injury. In
1962, the United States enacted Subpart F of the
Internal Revenue Code. Before Subpart F was en-
acted, a US multinational firm could establish a sell-
ing subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction (for example,
Switzerland) and US taxation of the profits earned
through distribution activity could be “deferred” until
the sales subsidiary decided to repatriate its income
to the US parent. Repatriation might not happen for
decades—and through the wonders of compound
interest tax deferred for decades is almost the same
as tax forgiven. Outright exemption or indefinite
deferral of sales subsidiary income was then, and
remains today, the normal practice among most in-
dustrial countries. The United States is one excep-
tion and France is another.3
The “antiabuse” provisions of Subpart F put US
exporters at a tax disadvantage compared to other
industrial country exporters. In 1962, this did not
seem to matter because US manufacturing compa-
nies were dominant suppliers of nearly all indus-
trial goods, and the United States then ran a per-
sistent trade surplus (concentrated in manufactured
goods). But the early postwar era of US industrial
dominance and trade surpluses soon drew to a close.
The DISC and the Tax Legislation Reports
 In 1971, faced with a growing trade deficit and
a more competitive world market for manufactured
goods, the United States introduced the Domestic
International Sales Corporation (DISC)—partial tax
deferral for the export earnings of a US corpora-
tion. DISC tax relief amounted to about 12 percent-
age points on export profits earned by the parent
corporation and its DISC (the normal corporate tax
rate was then 48 percent). Essentially the DISC was
intended to soften the self-inflicted damage to US
exporters arising from Subpart F.
The European Commission challenged the DISC
in 1974, arguing that it was a prohibited export sub-
sidy under the terms of GATT Article 16. The United
States argued that Article 16 only prohibited tax
exemption on export sales and that tax deferral un-
der the DISC was not the same as tax exemption.
The United States also invoked the “bi-level pricing
test” of Article 16, arguing that the European Com-
mission had not demonstrated that DISC exports
were sold cheaper than comparable goods in the
US home market.
In addition to these defenses, the United States
went on the offensive and challenged the European
“territorial approach.” Specifically, the United States
challenged Belgium, France, and the Netherlands
for exempting from their domestic corporate tax
systems the export earnings of sales subsidiaries
located in tax haven countries. None of the Euro-
pean countries then had an effective equivalent of
2. This description applies to a subtraction-method VAT. Most
credit-invoice-method VAT systems impose the tax on sales, and
allow a credit for VAT paid on purchased inputs. The base that
gets taxed in credit-invoice-method systems is the difference
between sales and purchased inputs, and this difference
essentially amounts to wages, interest, rent, and profits. In
economic substance, there is little distinction between a
subtraction-method VAT (where purchased inputs are
subtracted from the tax base) and a credit-invoice-method VAT
(where VAT paid on purchased inputs are subtracted from VAT
liability on sales). For a thorough description of VAT systems,
see Ebrill et al. (2001).
3. While France has a generous territorial tax system, it does not
allow deferral or exemption of foreign base company sales income.
See National Foreign Trade Council (2001).
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Subpart F for taxing the profits of foreign sales sub-
sidiaries. (Only a few European countries have ef-
fective equivalents today.)
A single GATT panel decided all the four tax cases
in 1976 (Tax Legislation Reports): the European case
against the DISC and the US case against Belgium,
France, and the Netherlands. All plaintiffs won and
all defendants lost. The panel ruled that tax deferral
was prohibited just like tax exemption, that territo-
rial systems as well as DISC violated Article 16, and
that it was up to the defendant to prove the absence
of bi-level pricing (a very heavy burden) and thus
the absence of any trade harm.
Upon reflection, the United States and the Eu-
ropean Commission both concluded that the reason-
ing of the Tax Legislation Reports was too sweeping.
Both parties used their authority in the GATT Council
to block acceptance of the panel rulings for the du-
ration of the Tokyo Round negotiations. Tax and trade
experts agreed that the thorny issues needed to be
resolved by negotiation.
The Tokyo Round Subsidies Code
 The Tokyo Round Code on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties implicitly settled the tax cases,
based on four principles:
·     The ancient distinction between direct and indi-
rect taxes was preserved and the indirect tax la-
bel was explicitly extended to VAT;
·      The United States agreed to repeal the DISC, but
not during the Carter Administration;
· Methods of avoiding double taxation—both the
exemption method associated with European ter-
ritorial system of taxation and the foreign tax
credit method associated with the US worldwide
system of taxation—are not prohibited subsidies
when applied to export sales;
· However, the arm’s length pricing standard is to
be observed in transactions between parent ex-
porting companies and their foreign sales sub-
sidiaries.
The agreement on territorial tax systems was
particularly important. As a major concession, the
United States accepted the European territorial tax
systems as applied to export sales (despite the con-
trary ruling of the GATT panel), provided that the
United States could take advantage of a similar sys-
tem for its own exports. Under the negotiated agree-
ment, economic processes located outside the ex-
porting country (foreign sales and after-service ac-
tivities) need not be taxed by the exporting nation.
However, arm’s length prices must be observed be-
tween related parties in export transactions. Other-
wise, a parent firm in the exporting country might
shift production profits to a low-tax jurisdiction
abroad. This agreement was codified in footnote 2 of
the Illustrative List of export subsidies appended to
the Tokyo Round Code on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties.
The 1981 GATT Council Decision
 Following the conclusion of the Tokyo Round,
in 1981 a GATT Council Decision disposed of the
four tax cases, with a Chairman’s note that reiter-
ated the bargain struck in the Tokyo Round Subsi-
dies Code. The Chairman’s note stated:
The Council adopts these reports on the
understanding that with respect to these cases, and
in general, economic processes (including
transactions involving exported goods) located
outside the territorial limits of the exporting country
need not be subject to taxation by the exporting
country and should not be regarded as export
activities in terms of Article XVI:4 of the General
Agreement. It is further understood that Article
XVI:4 requires that arm’s-length pricing be
observed, i.e., prices for goods in transactions
between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers
under their or the same control should for tax
purposes be the prices which would be charged
between independent enterprises acting at arm’s
length. Furthermore, Article XVI:4 does not prohibit
the adoption of measures to avoid double taxation
of foreign source income.
Based on the Chairman’s note and the Tokyo Round
Subsidies Code, in 1984 the United States repealed
the DISC, and enacted the FSC.4 The FSC allowed
partial tax exemption for the income of a foreign cor-
porate subsidiary derived from handling US export
sales. The amount of FSC income exempted was cal-
culated by a formula designed to approximate the
arm’s length pricing standard. Roughly it amounted
to tax relief of about 5.25 percentage points on ex-
port profits earned by the parent corporation and its
FSC (the normal corporate tax rate is now 35 per-
cent, and the FSC benefit usually amounts to about
15 percent of the corporate tax rate).
4. The transition from DISC to FSC was not entirely seamless.
Late in 1980, the US Trade Representative renounced the
“Hufbauer Understanding”, reached in June 1979, regarding
the disposition of the four Tax Legislation Reports. Neverthe-
less the Understanding served as the basis for the 1981 GATT
Council Decision adopting the Tax Legislation Reports, the 1982
commitment by the United States to repeal the DISC, the actual
repeal of the DISC in 1984, and the creation of the FSC in the
same year. See Hufbauer and Erb (1984) and Hufbauer and
Gabyzon (1996).November 2002 PB02-10 5
That is how things stood during the entire Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-
94). Never during the Round did Europe challenge
the FSC. US negotiators were lulled by the silence,
innocently believing that the 1979 Tokyo Round Sub-
sidies Code and the 1981 GATT Council Decision
had settled the tax wars of the 1970s. In fact, foot-
note 59 of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies
appended to the Uruguay Round Code on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Code) essentially
reiterated the Tokyo Round agreement.5
First Round of WTO Litigation
In 1997, breaking 16 years of tax peace, the Eu-
ropean Union challenged the FSC as a violation of
the SCM Code. This was indeed a surprise. The Eu-
ropean Union was motivated by a desire to create
bargaining chips, not by a raft of complaints from
European firms (in fact, the American subsidiaries
of many European multinationals take advantage
of the FSC). Sir Leon Brittan, then the chief trade
negotiator for the European Union, reasoned that a
victory against the FSC might be used to resolve
World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes already
lost by the European Union (particularly the beef
hormones dispute). Further, it might forestall US
challenges against a variety of EU practices: for ex-
ample, trade barriers against genetically modified
organisms (GMOs), Airbus subsidies, and agricul-
tural export subsidies (these become vulnerable
when the Uruguay Round “peace clause” expires in
December 2003).
From the standpoint of the European Union, Sir
Leon’s legal strategy proved a masterstroke. Unlike
the earlier DISC case, the United States did not at-
tempt offensive tactics in the FSC litigation, even
though aspects of European systems were suscep-
tible to attack. Instead, the United States relied solely
on defensive tactics. This reliance proved to be mis-
placed.
The first WTO FSC panel, in its October 1999
decision, gutted the understandings that the United
States had relied on for nearly two decades. The
panel stated that the 1981 Council Decision was
not “a legal instrument” of the GATT-1947. Since
the Council Decision was not “a legal instrument”—
even though it was reached after more strenuous
negotiation than any other Council Decision in
GATT’s history—the panel concluded that the 1981
Decision had not been adopted in the GATT-1994
by virtue of the grandfather clause.6
The WTO panel then went on to hold that the
FSC is a prohibited export subsidy: (a) because rev-
enue is foregone (Article 1 of the SCM Code); and
(b) because exports are taxed more favorably than
production abroad (a test newly invented by the
panel). Along the way to this holding, the panel
decided that footnote 59 of the SCM Code did not
permit a territorial exemption applied solely to ex-
port earnings.7 In February 2000, the WTO Appel-
late Body affirmed the panel report in all essential
respects. Having tossed aside the 1981 Decision
and narrowed footnote 59, the WTO’s legal bodies
awarded their verdict to the European Union.
5. The Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I of the
Uruguay Round Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Code) identifies exemption or deferral of direct taxes as
an export subsidy, reaffirms the arm’s length principle, and
permits measures (e.g., the territorial system) to avoid the double
taxation of foreign source income. See relevant text in box 1 on
p. 6.
6. GATT-1994 explicitly incorporated protocols, decisions, and
understandings that had previously entered into force under
GATT-1947. Specifically, Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement pro-
vides, in relevant part, that GATT-1994 shall consist of:
(a) the provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, dated 30 October 1947… as rectified, amended or
modified by the terms of legal instruments which have
entered into force before the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement;
(b) the provisions of the legal instruments set forth below that
have entered into force under the GATT 1947 before the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement:
…
(iv)   other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES
        to the GATT 1947;
…
The GATT contracting parties spent ten years, launched four
Tax Legislation Panels, and held numerous negotiating ses-
sions before concluding their tax disputes. US and European
differences were compromised in the carefully crafted 1981
GATT Council Decision. Yet the WTO panel and Appellate Body
held that ten years of litigation and negotiation did not suffice
to create a “legal instrument” as one of the “decisions of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES” under the terms of paragraph (b)(iv)
cited above.
7. The relevant language of SCM Code footnote 59 reads:
“…Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a Member from taking
measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income
earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of another Member.”
The FSC Panel Report conceded that footnote 59 recognizes that
territorial tax systems do not amount to per se export subsidies.
The Report then went on to invent a distinction that never
existed in the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code or the Uruguay
Round SCM Code. It distinguished a territorial system that
provides a “broad exemption of income deriving from foreign
economic activities” from a territorial system that provides an
exemption “specifically related to exports.” The former system
does not grant export subsidies, says the Report, whereas the
latter does. This distinction rendered the FSC inconsistent with
the SCM Code, while insulating the European territorial systems
that usually exempt a larger share of export profits from home
country corporate taxation than the FSC ever did. US business
firms find it anomalous that the WTO condemns a partial
territorial system like the FSC that might exempt 30 percent of
export profits, but exonerates a full territorial system that
usually exempts 50 percent of export profits.November 2002 PB02-10 6
In their decisions, however, neither the Panel
nor the Appellate Body ruled on the EU claim that
FSC violates the SCM Code because exports are
taxed more favorably than production for the US
home market. This omission seemingly left the
United States an opening to alter the contours of
the FSC while preserving much of its substance. It
appeared that the United States could avoid the
charge of granting an export subsidy by extending
its partial territorial tax system to the foreign pro-
duction of US firms the same way it was applied to
exports—thereby meet the newly created parity test.
The Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act
Seizing this apparent opening, in November 2000
the US Congress passed the Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion (ETI) Act. Under the ETI Act, the benefits
of the FSC are phased out. The ETI Act then goes
on to exclude from the US definition of gross in-
come certain foreign source income—namely a por-
tion of export earnings, and a portion of earnings
from production abroad. In other words, the United
States adopted a partial territorial system, provid-
ing some relief from double taxation both for ex-
ports and foreign production. However, corporate
taxpayers could only use the territorial method by
renouncing their foreign tax credits with respect to
the same earnings. The benefits of the ETI Act were
further conditioned on the use of less than 50 per-
cent foreign inputs of goods and services.
The United States contended that the ETI Act
conformed to the Appellate Body decision because:
(a) revenue was no longer foregone—ETI income was
no longer part of gross income subject to corporate
tax; (b) both export earnings and foreign produc-
tion earnings were similarly taxed under the ETI Act.
Second Round of WTO Litigation
The European Union brought a second case to
the WTO asserting four claims: (a) notwithstanding
the ETI Act, revenue was still foregone; (b) the ex-
port contingency remained, even if foreign produc-
tion was, in some circumstances, covered; (c) the
foreign content limitation for US exports under ETI
violated WTO Article 3 (national treatment); (d) the
FSC phaseout did not respect the first Appellate
Body deadline (October 2000).
In reaching its second decision, the WTO panel
expanded its earlier interpretation of footnote 59.
The ETI exclusion failed, according to the panel,
partly because it was too broadly drawn (it could
exempt income not taxed by another country) and
partly because it was too narrowly drawn (only
exports and selected foreign production are covered).
Along the way to this decision, the panel asserted
that any exclusion from gross income could depart
Box 1   Annex I: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies
[Among prohibited export subsidies, the Illustrative List includes]
(e) The full or partial exemption, remission or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes [58]
or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises. [59]
  58. For the purpose of this Agreement:
The term “direct taxes” shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms
      of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property;
The term “import charges” shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated
in this note that are levied on imports;
The term “indirect charges” shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer,
inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges;
“Prior-stage” indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in making the
product;
“Cumulative” indirect taxes are multi-stage taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent
crediting of the tax if the goods and services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in a succeeding
stage of production;
“Remission” of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes;
“Remission or drawback” includes the full or partial exemption or deferral of import charges.
      59. The Members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export subsidy where, for example, appropriate
      interest charges are collected.  The Members reaffirm the principle that prices charged for goods in
      transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or under the same control should
      for tax purposes be prices which would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm’s length…
      Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a Member from taking measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign-
      source income earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of another Member.November 2002 PB02-10 7
from the “normative benchmark” of the US tax
system, and thus could amount to a relief from tax
“otherwise due” (SCM Code Article 1.1(ii)), and hence
could be designated a subsidy.
The panel went on to hold that the ETI exemption
was “contingent on” exports—in other words, that
exporting was a condition for receiving the subsidy—
and thus was prohibited by SCM Code Article 3. The
fact that the ETI exclusion reached foreign production
in limited circumstances was not a saving feature.
As expected, the panel found that the foreign
content limitation violated the national treatment
standard, and that the FSC phaseout did not meet
the Appellate Body’s deadline. These features were,
however, secondary to the ETI Act, and could easily
have been corrected.
The Appellate Body affirmed the panel decision,
but with two important twists. In the first twist, the
Appellate Body abandoned the Panel’s “normative
benchmark” and instead defined “revenue otherwise
due” by referring to the alternative taxation of ETI
income when the taxpayer elects to claim a foreign
tax credit rather than the ETI. Since the rational
taxpayer will only elect the ETI when its US taxes
are lower than they would be under the foreign tax
credit method, the Appellate Body concluded that
the US Treasury has foregone “revenue otherwise
due.”
In its second twist, the Appellate Body delved
into ETI Act rules that determine the division of
export income between domestic and foreign sources.
The ETI allows a formula division rather than case-
by-case application of the arm’s length standard.
Using simple-minded examples, the Appellate Body
found circumstances where the formulas could
improperly characterize domestic source income as
foreign source income. Improper characterization
could in turn lead to tax exemption for domestic
profits earned on export production—another
violation of the SCM Code.
Along the way to these findings, the Appellate
Body returned to some elements of the bargain struck
in the 1981 GATT Council Decision. The Appellate
Body reaffirmed the arm’s length principle for
distinguishing between domestic source and foreign
source profits earned on export sales. The Appellate
Body confirmed that foreign source income, properly
computed, could be exempt from tax (the territorial
system) and the exemption would not automatically
amount to an export subsidy prohibited by the SCM
Code. However, the Appellate Body continued to insist
(unlike the 1981 Decision and footnote 59) that
exemption created a problem when it was limited to
some foreign source income (the ETI Act) rather than
all, or nearly all, foreign source income (the European
territorial systems).8
The Arbitration Award  award
The European Union hit the jackpot with the ar-
bitration award. Under the SCM Code, an Arbitral
panel decides “appropriate countermeasures” (Ar-
ticles 4.10 and 4.11)—in the event that the offender
does not “withdraw the subsidy without delay.” The
Arbitral panel’s ruling cannot be appealed. In Au-
gust 2002, the Arbitral panel announced that the
European Union was entitled to $4.043 billion of
annual countermeasures against the United States—
a level of retaliation that far exceeds anything previ-
ously authorized in the GATT system. The $4.043
billion figure is simply the amount of FSC tax ben-
8. The key elements of the two WTO decisions can be summa-
rized in five propositions:
· Under Article 1 of the SCM Code, the FSC/ETI system
amounts to a subsidy because the US Treasury foregoes
revenue “otherwise due.”
· Under Article 3 of the SCM Code, the FSC/ETI system
amounts to a prohibited export subsidy because it is a sub-
sidy under Article 1 and because its benefits are contin-
gent on export activity.
· The 1981 GATT Council Decision that permitted a territo-
rial tax system that is limited to export activity (such as the
FSC) was not incorporated in the GATT-1994.
· SCM Code footnote 59 permits a territorial tax system that
exempts all, or nearly all, foreign source income—both ex-
ports and foreign production. But it does not permit a terri-
torial tax system limited to export income.
· The arm’s length pricing rule must be observed in distin-
guishing between domestic and foreign source income.
WTO members that so choose can draw on these propositions
to bring numerous tax cases against other WTO members, both
as offensive and defensive trade strategies. Export processing
zones, widely used by developing countries, are vulnerable. So
is the US export-source rule. Some of the territorial tax systems
applied in Europe and elsewhere may not be sufficiently broad
to meet the WTO’s “all-or-nothing” test.
In 1997, breaking 16 years
of tax peace, the European Union
challenged the FSC as a violation
of the SCM Code. This was
indeed a surprise. The European Union
was motivated by a desire
 to create bargaining chips,
not by a raft of complaints
from European firms.  November 2002 PB02-10 8
efits in a recent year (2000).9 It has nothing to do
with trade harm inflicted on the European Union—
estimated by the United States at $1.110 billion. In-
deed, the Arbitral panel abandoned any effort at
measuring trade harm. Under the panel’s peculiar
logic, another WTO member could also bring a claim
against the FSC and gain an award on top of the
$4.043 billion granted to the European Union.
Before the FSC award, punitive damages were
not part of the GATT enforcement apparatus. Indeed
the cornerstone of the GATT is the contractual “bal-
ance of concessions” between members. The stan-
dard remedy for any contractual breach is a damage
award equal to the harm actually imposed. If one
member violates the GATT rights of another, thereby
diminishing the injured member’s exports or increas-
ing its imports, the injured member can therefore
withdraw an equivalent amount of market access.
By contrast with this established precedent, the FSC
Arbitral panel created a new measure of damages
for prohibited export subsidies—the worldwide value
of the subsidy itself, not the trade damage inflicted
on the complaining country. While punitive damages
of this sort are familiar to American tort lawyers,
they were previously unknown to the GATT.
US Exporters in the Briar Patch
This string of adverse WTO decisions has thrown
US exporters in the briar patch. If the ETI is not
repealed, the European Union can fire at will from
its ample arsenal of retaliatory ammunition. The Eu-
ropean Union has already published a trial “hit list”
of products, heavily featuring agriculture. No one ex-
pects the European Union to poison the Doha Round
by indiscriminate retaliation.10 But until the ETI is
repealed, the arsenal will at the very least dampen
US initiatives aimed at curbing EU agricultural sub-
sidies or opening EU markets to GMOs.
But if the ETI is repealed, with nothing to take
its place, US exporters will again compete on a tilted
tax field. Not only will they have to pay VAT on sales
into Europe, Canada, Mexico, and other countries,
they will also have to pay full corporate income tax
on their export earnings. Meanwhile competitors
based in Europe and elsewhere will export their
goods into the US market free of VAT and take ad-
vantage of selling subsidiaries located in low-tax ju-
risdictions. This kind of tax tilt was a driving force
behind enactment of the DISC in 1971, the FSC in
1984, and the ETI in 2000. It seems unlikely that
the tax discontent harbored by US exporters will
melt away if ETI is repealed in 2003.
Some scholars contend that a cure-all balm al-
ready exists for tax discontent: the system of float-
ing exchange rates. Any business tax advantage en-
joyed by European firms—whether springing from
VAT border adjustments or different corporate tax
systems—will ultimately be offset by a stronger euro.
Why fuss over “tax fairness” when floating exchange
rates will mop up any tax advantage or disadvan-
tage?
Among its shortcomings, the floating exchange
rate argument fails the Missouri test (“show me”).
Floating exchange rates do not ensure that trade
deficits and surpluses revert to zero in the short or
medium term. That observation is too crude to de-
termine whether tax disadvantages are washed away
by exchange rate changes. Macroeconomic analysis
teaches that national trade deficits and surpluses—
and corresponding equilibrium exchange rates—are
ultimately determined by national savings and in-
vestment balances. Tax policy alters exchange rates
only when changes in the tax system affect national
savings and investment behavior. Who knows
whether VAT adjustment rules alter European sav-
ings and investment behavior? If the rules promote
European investment, with no effect on savings, the
euro will appreciate to restore macroeconomic equi-
librium. If the rules have no effect on European sav-
ings and investment, nothing much will happen to
the foreign exchange value of the euro.
All that said, the fact that huge trade imbalances
persist in a world of floating exchange rates colors
10. It appears that the United States and the European Union
have reached an informal retaliation-standstill agreement while
the Doha Round goes forward. In 2002, the European Union
did not retaliate (as it had threatened) against US safeguard
tariffs on steel, and the United States did not launch (as some
agricultural firms wanted) a new case on EU barriers to GMOs.
The House and Senate have
different approaches to solving
the FSC/ETI problem
and extricating US exporters
from the briar patch.
9. The FSC Arbitral panel followed the precedent set in the Brazil-
Aircraft (Article 22.6) arbitration. There the arbitrator held that
“appropriate countermeasures” means “the full amount of the
subsidy to be withdrawn”—not the level of trade impairment to
Canada (as Brazil had argued). However, in the Brazil-Aircraft
case, both Brazil and Canada were competing head-to-head in
the same markets (principally the US market) for mid-range civil
aircraft sales. Circumstances in the FSC case were entirely
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the political debate over border tax adjustments.11
To put it bluntly, the argument that European bor-
der tax advantages have been eliminated by a strong
euro and a weak dollar seems laughable to Ameri-
can exporters. If the exchange rate argument was
persuasive, European firms might allow their gov-
ernments to abandon border tax adjustments for the
VAT. This is not going to happen. European firms
see a mercantile advantage in the current tax rules,
whatever scholars may say.
At a more sophisticated level of debate, the pre-
scription to forget about tax competition in a world
of floating exchange rates overlooks recent research.12
According to John Mutti’s (2003) work, the response
of export-oriented business activity to corporate taxa-
tion may be an elasticity coefficient as high as 4.0.
In other words, a 5 percentage-point reduction in
the corporate tax rate may increase export-oriented
activity by as much as 20 percent. Even half that
amount would be significant. In most countries, the
export sector pays better wages and offers more
stable employment than other sectors.13 In a world
economy of high tax response coefficients, a country
taxes its export sector at the expense of its own pros-
perity.
House Says Legislate, Senate Says Negotiate
The House and Senate have different approaches
to solving the FSC/ETI problem and extricating US
exporters from the briar patch. Congressman Bill
Thomas (R-CA), chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, advocates a legislative solution.
His initial proposal offered a package of interna-
tional tax reforms: repeal the ETI, modify Subpart
F to permit US firms to operate sales subsidiaries
from low-tax jurisdictions, deter “corporate inver-
sions,” reform the allocation of interest expenses
between US and foreign operations, and simplify
the system of multiple foreign tax credit baskets.
Senator Max Baucus (D-Montana), chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee, instead advocates
a negotiated solution. He proposes to change WTO
rules so as to level the tilt in the tax playing field.
While Baucus has not staked out a negotiating
agenda, one solution might be a simple reinstate-
ment of the 1981 GATT Council Decision, thereby
permitting a territorial system for exports alone. A
more fundamental solution would be to revisit the
ancient distinction between border adjustability of
direct and indirect taxes.14
For the moment, the US Treasury and the Eu-
ropean Union have lined up with the House ap-
proach. The Treasury sees no room for maneuver
within the existing text of the SCM Code and EU
Commissioner Pascal Lamy opposes negotiated
changes.15 The combined forces of the House Ways
and Means chairman, the US Treasury, and the
European Union might seem to settle the debate.
But a key constituency is missing: US exporters.
Many US exporters, particularly small and me-
dium-sized firms, believe that Subpart F reform
(Chairman Thomas’s approach) will not help them.
Their cash requirements are centered in the United
States, where their operations are based. Profits
distributed from a foreign sales subsidiary to the
US parent firm would be fully taxed at the US cor-
porate rate. For these firms there would be no tax
advantage from establishing a foreign sales sub-
sidiary, even after Subpart F is reformed.
When Congress adjourned in October 2002, the
FSC/ETI debate was at an impasse: a Senate ap-
proach, a House approach, discontented exporters,
and no winning coalition.
12. Another weakness of the floating exchange rate argument is
that it assumes tax rates are uniform across all sectors of the
economy. VAT and corporate taxes are anything but uniform.
Unless they are adjusted sector by sector, an exchange rate offset
will be too generous to lightly taxed sectors and not generous
enough to heavily taxed sectors. See Hufbauer and Gabyzon
(1996).
13. See Richardson and Rindal (1996). In the United States,
export jobs pay about 15 percent higher on average than other
sectors.
14. In a serious negotiation, for example, the distinction between
direct and indirect taxes might be replaced by a more rational
distinction between business and personal taxes. Border
adjustments, under the destination principle, might be
permitted (not required) for business taxes, but not for personal
taxes. With this change, business firms, wherever located, could
compete on the same tax terms in all markets. Many details
would need to be worked out. For example, countries might
negotiate limits on their border adjustments, both for exports
and imports. Conceivably, after several rounds of negotiations,
border adjustments would be significantly reduced and only
peak taxes would be rebated on exports and imposed on
imports.
15. See Inside U.S. Trade, vol. 20, no. 39, September 27, 2002,
28-31.
The core idea [of the new approach]
is US repeal of the FSC/ETI
and simultaneous adoption of an
elective alternative corporate tax
that fits the WTO definition
of a value added tax.
11. See Bergsten and Williamson (forthcoming 2003) for a broad
survey of dollar overvaluation issues.November 2002 PB02-10 10
The Last Act: An Alternative Corporate Tax?
Behind the scenes, a new approach has attracted
some attention outside the halls of Congress and the
Treasury.16 The new approach has considerable merit
both as a means of leveling the tax field and as a way
of ending the tax battle. The core idea is US repeal of
the FSC/ETI and simultaneous adoption of an elec-
tive Alternative Corporate Tax (ACT) that fits the WTO
definition of a value added tax.
Outline of the ACT
The ACT would be akin to a subtraction-method
VAT.17 The ACT base would be sales within the United
States by an affiliated group of US corporations (net-
ting out purchases and sales between group mem-
bers), minus purchases from unrelated firms. The
ACT base would resemble the VAT base. By compari-
son with the existing corporate income tax (CIT), the
ACT would have these differences:
· Like the VAT, export sales of goods and services
would be excluded from the tax base.
· Like the VAT, production abroad for sales to for-
eign markets would be excluded from the tax base.
· Like the VAT, employee compensation (wages and
fringe benefits) would be included in the tax base.
· Like the VAT, interest, rents, dividends, and re-
tained corporate earnings would be included in
the tax base.
· Unlike many VAT systems, the ACT would be
nonrefundable.18 A company that had a negative
tax base (for example, because most of its output
was exported, and its purchased inputs exceeded
its domestic sales) would get no ACT refund. At
best, it would pay zero ACT.
· Unlike the VAT, the ACT would not tax imports
(either explicitly or by disallowing a deduction
from the tax base). This feature should be wel-
comed by US trading partners. In any event, the
GATT does not require symmetrical border ad-
justments for exports and imports.
· To prevent abuse, however, the ACT base would
include sales into the US market by controlled
foreign corporations (CFCs) of the affiliated US
corporate group, when the CFC sales included a
substantial amount of US exports that benefited
from that group’s ACT exclusion.19
· OASDHI payroll taxes (Social Security taxes) paid
by the corporation would be credited against its
ACT liability. Just as VAT revenues are used by
many European countries to fund their social
security systems, so ACT revenues would be used
indirectly, in part, to fund the US system.
The ACT rate would be designed to achieve rev-
enue neutrality, taking into account the revenue
gains from repeal of the FSC/ETI. Detailed calcula-
tions would be required to establish the tax rate,
but a figure of about 15 percent seems possible, com-
pared to the existing corporate rate of 35 percent.
Because it excludes foreign source income (ex-
port sales and foreign production for sales abroad),
the ACT would prove especially attractive for US firms
oriented toward the international market. The ACT
system could be adopted by any firm, large or small.
Its advantages do not depend on operating an off-
shore sales subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction, much
less on producing offshore.
Election to use the ACT would apply to all mem-
bers of an affiliated corporate group (the group that
files a consolidated federal tax return), even those
18. On the refundability of VAT, see Ebrill et al. (2001), chapter
15. The reason (apart from a concern about lost revenue) to make
the ACT nonrefundable is to avert a possible WTO challenge that
the refund amounted to a prohibited export subsidy. Since firms
that supplied purchased inputs to the ACT corporation may have
paid taxes under the normal CIT system, their tax payments
could not be characterized as VAT. Hence a refund of ACT on
such inputs might be characterized, under the Uruguay Round
SCM Code’s Illustrative List of Export Subsidies as an excessive
remission, in violation of paragraph (g).
The alternative corporate tax
would appear to be immune
from a fresh WTO challenge,
because it would be designed to fit
with the WTO definition of a value
added tax. Under the Uruguay
Round SCM Code,
value added tax can be adjusted
at the border. Period.
17. For an exposition of different methods of imposing VAT, see
Ebrill et al. (2001).
16.The leading proponent is Ernest Christian, General Counsel
of the Committee for Strategic Tax Reform, based in Washington,
DC.
19. In the absence of an antiabuse rule, US corporations would
be tempted to engage in “round-trip” transactions. They might
export products from the United States and benefit from the
ACT exclusion, then import the same products (or slightly
transformed versions) back into the United States and sell them
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corporate members that only serve the domestic mar-
ket. Moreover the election would be irreversible. The
purpose of such rules is to preclude “gaming” the
two tax systems, by switching between the ACT and
the CIT.
ACT and the WTO
 The ACT would appear to be immune from a
fresh WTO challenge, because it would be designed
to fit with the WTO definition of a value added tax.
Under the Uruguay Round SCM Code, VAT can be
adjusted at the border. Period. There is no require-
ment that the VAT apply to all sectors of the economy
or that the VAT be applied at a uniform rate.20 More-
over, the nonrefundable feature of the ACT should
ward off any complaint that ACT entails an “exces-
sive remission” of taxes on export sales.
Yet nothing is certain in the realm of WTO juris-
prudence. The WTO judicial machinery has already
stretched the limits in its FSC and ETI decisions.
Given this record, no one can say with certainty that
ACT would survive a fresh WTO challenge. In par-
ticular, the WTO judicial machinery might distin-
guish between a subtraction-method VAT (which the
ACT emulates) and a credit-method VAT. Despite the
economic similarity of the two value added taxes,
the WTO Appellate Body might claim that destina-
tion-principle border adjustments are permitted for
a credit-method VAT but not for a subtraction-
method VAT.
Alternatively, the WTO judicial machinery might
apply its “but for” test to the ACT. Firms will pre-
sumably elect the ACT only when they perceive a
long-run tax advantage. Hence the WTO Appellate
Body might say that, in creating the ACT system,
the US Treasury has foregone “revenue otherwise
due,” because the US tax law now permits an elec-
tion—and rational firms will only make the election
if they expect to pay lower taxes.
Because of these judicial hazards, a belt-and-
suspenders approach has much to commend it. To
insulate the ACT from a new WTO challenge, the
Congress should add two supplementary provisions
in the enabling legislation.
First, Congress should instruct the US Treasury
and the US Trade Representative to bring a WTO
case against any foreign country that challenges the
ACT, if elements of that country’s tax system argu-
ably violate the WTO. This instruction would rein-
vigorate the successful offensive/defensive strategy
that ultimately resulted in tax peace at the conclu-
sion of the Tokyo Round.
Second, Congress should give the US Commerce
Department a “big gun” that advertises US serious-
ness—especially to the Europeans. Here’s the de-
sign. In the event the WTO upholds a challenge
against the ACT and authorizes another member to
retaliate, at the discretion of the Commerce Depart-
ment the United States will accept a countervailing
duty (CVD) petition against VAT rebates on exports
from that country. To be sure, the imposition of CVDs
would be the last resort. If ever imposed against a
VAT rebate, CVDs could trigger another wave of WTO-
sanctioned retaliation. A true trade war could erupt.
But US authorizing legislation would put potential
challengers on notice that the United States no longer
accepts a tilted tax field.
20. Annex I, The Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, of the
Uruguay SCM Code contains the provision that allows
destination-principle adjustments for value added taxes:
      g) The exemption or remission, in respect of the production
      and distribution of exported products, of indirect taxes [58]
      in excess of those levied in respect of the production and
      distribution of like products when sold for domestic
      consumption.
           [58] For the purpose of this Agreement:
   …
   The term “indirect taxes” shall mean sales, excise,
   turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer,
   inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and
   all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges;
   ...      November 2002 PB02-10 12
The Goal
The objective is good jobs in America, both in
manufacturing and other sectors of the economy.
Therefore, the tax code should encourage compa-
nies to “make it here and sell it there” instead of
needlessly forcing them offshore.
The Proposal
 The proposal is to replace the existing FSC/ETI
provision with a new system that is (a) WTO-legal
and (b) more beneficial to exporters and other firms
that compete in international markets. A corpora-
tion will be allowed to elect an Alternative Corpo-
rate Tax (ACT) that excludes from tax:
·  All US-source income from producing goods and
services in the United States that are sold to for-
eigners, and
·  All foreign-source income from producing goods
and services abroad that are sold to foreigners.
The Tax Base
 Because ACT has a base equal to value added
instead of net income, its tax base differs from the
current Corporate Income Tax (CIT). As with the CIT
and VAT systems, the corporation is allowed to de-
duct purchases from unrelated firms. However, the
corporation is not allowed to deduct compensation
paid to employees. The corporation is allowed no
deduction for interest paid on debt. In other words,
earnings accrued (or paid) to shareholders and in-
terest paid to bondholders are both part of the ACT
base. Interest and dividends received are, however,
excluded from the tax base. (An ACT corporation’s
tax base is therefore not affected if it receives and
pays the same amount of interest.) Overall, the tax
base under ACT would tend to be larger than under
CIT, and therefore the ACT rate can be lower.
The Rate of Tax
The ACT would be designed to be revenue neu-
tral (taking into account the revenue gained from
repeal of the FSC/ETI). Because of its broader tax
base, the tax rate under ACT would be lower than
under CIT—in the area of 15 percent.
Nonrefundable
 The ACT would be nonrefundable. An ACT cor-
poration that has a negative tax base (for example,
because it exports most of its production, and its
purchased inputs exceed its domestic sales) would
not be entitled to a refund of ACT tax. Nor could a
negative tax base in year one be carried to succes-
sive tax years.
Credit for OASDHI
 OASDHI payroll taxes (Social Security taxes) paid
by the corporation would be credited against its ACT
liability.
Application of WTO
 Under WTO rules, the CIT and other taxes on
net income are classified as direct taxes that cannot
be adjusted at the border. ACT has a base equal to
value added instead of net income. The ACT base is
calculated in the same manner as a subtraction-
method VAT base. Under the WTO, taxes on value
added are classified as indirect taxes and are ex-
pressly eligible for adjustment at the border. In Eu-
rope and elsewhere, value added taxes neither reach
exports nor production abroad. Like VAT, the ACT is
territorial in nature and does not apply to sales that
occur outside the territory of the United States. Since
ACT is nonrefundable, it cannot be claimed that ACT
allows an “excessive remission” of taxes on exported
goods and services.
ACT is Elective
ACT applies only to corporations that elect the
new system rather than the CIT. If made, the elec-
tion applies to all members of an affiliated corporate
group (the group that files a consolidated federal
return) and the election is irrevocable. When an ACT
corporation merges with a CIT corporation, the new
corporation would be automatically subject to ACT,
unless more than 75 percent of the merged
corporation’s assets were attributable to the old CIT
corporation.
Drafting Model
The drafting model would be the Simplified USA
Tax in H.R. 86, modified to eliminate the USA tax on
inbound transactions (imports), with depreciation
instead of expensing for capital goods, and with regu-
lar CIT inventory accounting instead of the cash ac-
counting system in H.R. 86. The overall goal is to
bring the ACT within the WTO definition of a value
added tax.
Repatriation of Foreign Earnings
 Post-election foreign-source income of an ACT
corporation would be free of US tax and therefore
could readily be repatriated and reinvested in the
Appendix A: Possible Details of an Alternative Corporate Tax
Adapted from a proposal by Ernest Christian, General Counsel to the Committee for Strategic Tax ReformThe views expressed in this publication are those of the author. This publication is part of the
overall  program of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily
reflect the views of individual members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
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US economy—instead of having to be reinvested
abroad as a means of deferring US tax, as happens
under the CIT. Similarly, because post-election for-
eign-source income is exempt from US tax, no for-
eign tax credits would be allowed on those earn-
ings.
Preelection Foreign Earnings
Many ACT corporations would have preelection
tax-deferred foreign-source income. Some might
have preelection foreign tax credits that were un-
used under CIT. Under the ACT, electing compa-
nies would be allowed to repatriate all preelection
tax-deferred income upon paying a toll charge, say
10 percent. However, all preelection foreign tax cred-
its would be forfeited.
Guarding Against Abuse
Every tax system is subject to abuse and needs
antiabuse rules. A few areas require special atten-
tion under the ACT system:
•    Exception to exemption for foreign sales of goods
and services. In general, the ACT would exempt
foreign sales by members of the affiliated group,
whether export sales or production abroad. How-
ever, sales that essentially amount to “round
trip” transactions—exports from the United
States, followed by US imports—would be in-
cluded in the ACT base, even if some value is
added by processing abroad.
•   Importation from controlled foreign corporations
(CFCs). CFCs are not part of the affiliated US
group; they do not file a consolidated federal tax
return with the US members. Normally, the
afiliated group can deduct the cost of imported
inputs purchased from its CFCs. In fact, intrafirm
trade is a source of enormous efficiency in the
world economy, and should not be discouraged.
However, in situations where imported inputs
amount to “round trip” transactions, the deduc-
tion would be disallowed.
•    Lease transactions. Interest payments are not
deductible under the ACT, but lease payments
are deductible. Obviously, capital equipment can
be acquired under lease arrangements that build
in an interest charge, as well as under traditional
borrowing and purchase arrangements. In excep-
tional circumstances, an ACT corporation may
find a tax advantage in leasing equipment from a
related CIT corporation (where the CIT corpora-
tion is owned in part by the ACT corporation, but
is not a member of the affiliated corporate group).
In these circumstances, the lease payment may
be recharacterized as a nondeductible interest ex-
pense.